Piper PA24-180 | N5520P

DTSB: The DTSB determines the Probable Cause of this accident to be Pilot Error, in that the accident pilot did attempt a takeoff with a known engine problem of some type. The previous takeoff from this same airport was after picking up his two children, for the purpose of taking them to his apartment in Destin, Florida. Instead of going direct to Destin, that flight instead went due south to Marianna, Florida where it was met by Trey Neville of Neville Aviation, and the aircraft was worked on for a majority of the day. The accident pilots two children recall their Dad being very nervous and quiet during that short flight from KEUF to KMAI. That memorable takeoff from KEUF was also witnessed by an experienced A&P/IA who observed the takeoff and described the engine as running very rough and missing. See his statement in NTSB docket. Upon landing at KMAI, the nature of the complaint, the reason for the large diversion, the Neville Aviation solution, associated maintenance entries, any aircraft return to service documentation, and aircraft logbook records are all still unknown, and have never been requested by the NTSB. Recently uncovered text documentation by the accident pilot shows that the logbooks were left with Neville Aviation. On the day of the accident, the pilot returned from Destin to to KEUF with his children on board, in order to drop them back off with his former wife – all in accordance with a court ordered custody agreement and schedule. The takeoff and flight from Destin to Eufaula was even more memorable, and the children recalled that their Dad was sweating and strangely quiet for the entire trip. Upon his subsequent departure on runway 36, the accident pilot began to lose engine thrust immediately after the gear was retracted. The 2 passengers (the accident pilot’s children) had been dropped off at KEUF and were not on board. No one saw the accident occur, so the exact time of the crash cannot be determined. However, ADSb CSV file suggests an impact at around 12:40 pm local time. After takeoff, the accident aircraft turned left to about 345-degree heading, before beginning a very aggressive right turn back to the airport. The aircraft never lost total thrust, as they were able to maintain a very sick and shallow climb and maneuver for an immediate return to the opposite runway for a landing attempt. The aircraft reached a total height of approximately 300 feet AGL, whereupon the gear and flaps were extended for an intended return to opposite direction runway 18. The Impossible Turn was once again impossible and the attempt to return to runway 18 resulted in a fatal loss of control. The aircraft impacted flat terrain fully stalled, and mostly vertical with the left wing low. The accident pilot was killed on impact and was displaced to the right side of the wreckage. The accident wreckage was not discovered until the next day by a pilot who was going to use runway 18 for takeoff. The reason for the reduction of thrust on takeoff (ROTOT) abnormal has not been determined. The aircraft was found almost 24 hours later, and fuel was still running from the compromised left wing tank supply line, where right main fuel supply was gravity flowing to the left main tank breached line location, and running out on the ground. From the NTSB final report: “Fuel was observed leaking from the breached fuel system. The left fuel selector was positioned to “OFF” and securely in the detent, while the right fuel selector was positioned to “R MAIN” and also secured in the detent.” After reviewing during a site visit in March of 2026, a bare spot is now observed at the exact location directly below where the compromised left wing fuel line would have been positioned. While normal grass is evident in site pictures at the same spot from the day of the accident, no grass has regrown in this small 3-foot diameter circle, indicating a tremendous amount of fuel permeation into the soil. Those that knew the accident pilot indicated that he was meticulous, careful, and was very conservative concerning the amount of fuel to be carried. Since the fuel selector was found in the right position, and the right tank was found both empty and not breached, the NTSB investigator Eric Alleyene errored in his final report conclusion that the pilot attempted a takeoff on a right main tank that had no fuel in it. The NTSB investigator therefore did not perform any standard tests on the engine or accessories to determine the reason for the inflight reduction of thrust after takeoff. The NTSB investigator was both lazy and not knowledgeable in not being able to understand the PA-24 fuel system, that with the right main fuel selector in the “ON” position, fuel would gravity flow all remaining fuel from the right main tank under the fuselage to the lowest point of system breach on the left wing, and onto the ground. The accident pilot departed KEUF that day with an estimated 25 gallons of fuel in the right main fuel tank. The NTSB was able to obtain accurate ADSb data CSV format and placed that data in the NTSB docket, but failed to use the data to draw a 3-dimensional picture of the flight path. The DTSB has now imported the data and converted it to a KML file and the impossible turn flight path is very clear. The deceased pilot autopsy showed significant levels of Sertraline and Desmethylsertraline, prescription medications often used for any number of several reasons, but both require FAA approval in order to use. There was no documented history of these prescription drugs being reported on the airman’s medical applications.
The DTSB determines the NTSB errored in its final report conclusion; that being that the accident pilot attempted a takeoff on a fuel tank that contained no fuel, and that the engine failed in flight due to fuel starvation. Not True.

The DTSB determines the true Probable Cause of this accident to be Pilot Error, in that the accident pilot did attempt a takeoff with a known and previously documented engine problem of some type, and that the same engine suffered a repeated reduction in thrust after takeoff. In addition, the accident pilot’s decision to turn aggressively towards the opposite runway, attempt the impossible turn, and extend the landing gear was the final cause of all remaining energy being lost in that turn. The incentive for the aggressive and imperative attempt to return to a paved runway was likely the documented mechanical problems, as well as the unreported and unapproved prescription drug usage. Numerous other guaranteed survivable open off field options were easily available to the accident pilot, but would have resulted in extensive FAA investigation, and likely loss of career.

NTSB: The absence of fuel in the fuel tanks after the accident, particularly the selected and intact right main fuel tank, and combined with the lack of evidence supporting a mechanical reason for a loss of engine power, suggest that all of the available fuel in the right main fuel tank had been exhausted during the accident flight takeoff. This ultimately resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain as the pilot attempted to maneuver back toward the departure runway.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
A total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot’s inadequate fuel planning/management.

DTSB: The DTSB recommends that all pilots of all aircraft become aware of the AQP scenario number 21, “The Impossible Turn” and condition themselves to resist the temptation to turn back to the airport. The DTSB recommends that pilots learn to lower the nose and land straight ahead during loss of thrust, or reduction of thrust after takeoff. The DTSB recommends wings level, full flaps, gear up, land the plane, step out, go to dinner. There were numerous flat open fields ahead and to the left after takeoff that were easily available, as well as survivable terrain straight ahead. The DTSB also recommends that all operators of PA-24 and PA-30 aircraft modify the checklists to show that BOTH fuel selectors be selected to the ON position for takeoff and landing.

NTSB: NONE.